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ABSTRACT
Public and private institutions must often allocate scarce resources
under uncertainty. Banks, for example, extend credit to loan appli-
cants based in part on their estimated likelihood of repaying a loan.
But when the quality of information differs across candidates (e.g.,
if some applicants lack traditional credit histories), common lending
strategies can lead to disparities across groups. Here we consider a
setting in which decision makers—before allocating resources—can
choose to spend some of their limited budget further screening
select individuals. We present a computationally efficient algorithm
for deciding whom to screen that maximizes a standard measure
of social welfare. Intuitively, decision makers should screen candi-
dates on the margin, for whom the additional information could
plausibly alter the allocation. We formalize this idea by showing
the problem can be reduced to solving a series of linear programs.
Both on synthetic and real-world datasets, this strategy improves
utility, illustrating the value of targeted information acquisition in
such decisions. Further, when there is social value for distributing
resources to groups for whom we have a priori poor information—
like those without credit scores—our approach can substantially
improve the allocation of limited assets.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation → Mathematical optimization; •
Computing methodologies → Machine learning; • Applied
computing→ Economics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Approximately one in seven U.S. households have unmet demand
for small-dollar loans, and are often unable to secure credit from
traditional financial institutions as they have little or no formal
credit history [1]. However, in the majority of these households,
individuals receive regular income and typically pay their bills on
time, which suggests many in fact would have low risk of default [1].
One barrier to providing loans to this low-risk yet underserved sub-
population is that it can be more expensive and time-consuming to
screen individuals with non-traditional financial histories, limiting
the inclusiveness of the banking system.
Motivated by this problem, we propose and analyze a strategy in
which one can pay to acquire additional information on applicants.
The task for a budget-constrained decision maker is thus to first
select a set of candidates to screen and then, given the results of that
screening process, determine to whom to allocate the remaining
resources. In modeling this situation, we assume there is a fixed
cost for screening each applicant, and that decision makers have
prior knowledge of the distribution of information they would
receive if they choose to screen an applicant. In practice, we note
that such prior knowledge could be obtained by screening a small
random sample of applicants to learn the resulting information
distributions.
We derive an efficient algorithm for computing an optimal, utility-
maximizing strategy for the general screening and allocation prob-
lem. To do so, we first show that once a set of candidates has been
selected to screen, it is optimal to allocate the remaining resources
according to a threshold rule, with assets distributed to those candi-
dates having post-screening expected utility above a fixed threshold.
Further, for any fixed threshold policy, we show that one can find
the optimal set of candidates to screen (while satisfying the bud-
get constraint) via a linear program. Intuitively, one should screen
candidates near the margin, for whom the screening process could
reveal information that could push a candidate across the threshold.
But to do this rigorously, one also needs to account for the precise
structure of the prior information. Finally, we sweep over the pos-
sible thresholds, solving the corresponding linear program at each
point. In this manner, we obtain both a rule to screen candidates
and a specific threshold policy for distributing funds to candidates
with sufficiently high post-screening value.
We further consider an extension of the above problem in which
policymakers have explicit value for diversity. For example, in-
stead of simply finding a max-utility policy, one might maximize
utility subject to the constraint that a particular group—such as
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those who traditionally have had limited access to credit markets—
achieve at least a fixed minimum utility. In the United States, those
with unmet demand for credit are disproportionately black and
Hispanic [1], heightening the value of diversity considerations in
allocation decisions. We show that this (and related) extensions
can be incorporated into our general algorithmic approach in a
straightforward manner.
To demonstrate the potential value of augmenting allocation
decisions with a screening phase, we apply our methods to both
synthetic datasets and one with real measures of creditworthiness.
In particular, we examine the potential benefits of screening as a
function of the cost and value of information. Especially when we
impose a diversity constraint, we find that screening strategies can
significantly outperform a naive strategy that simply attempts to
satisfy the constraint without screening any applicants.
For concreteness, we frame our discussion in terms of lending
decisions, though our approach applies to many allocation settings.
For example, it is often challenging to accurately assess house-
hold wealth—particularly in countries where informal and irregular
work is more common—and, in turn, to appropriately target the
distribution of government subsidies [23]. The simple strategy of
distributing funds to those families clearly in need can systemati-
cally overlook populations with harder-to-verify financial status.
As with lending, one can judiciously allocate some of the budget
to more extensively screen certain applicants, ensuring funds are
ultimately distributed to those who can benefit the most.
2 RELATEDWORK
Several papers address the problem of active feature acquisition [20,
21, 26], where one can selectively purchase missing data to improve
the overall out-of-sample performance of a statistical model. We
consider the related problem of acquiring features to identify spe-
cific, high-value individuals. While there is some shared intuition
between the two settings—that one should seek information on in-
dividuals most likely to alter downstream decisions—the technical
approach we take is different, in large part because our end goal is
optimal allocation rather than statistical learning.
In a related, recent stream of research, Bakker et al. [2] and
Noriega-Campero et al. [23] likewise consider a feature acquisition
problem, but with fairness constraints. In their setting, the decision
maker must acquire additional features for each individual to en-
sure classification decisions have similar errors rates across groups—
including parity in false negative and false positive rates—a common
measure of fairness in the machine learning community [8, 16, 18].
Our approach to the problem differs in three important respects.
First, we adopt the perspective of constrained utility maximization.
Past work has shown that directly equalizing error rates can lead
to outcomes that, counterintuitively, may harm the very groups
they were designed to protect [9, 10, 19]. We avoid such deleterious
outcomes by instead framing the problem explicitly in terms of
group-specific utilities: fairness is encoded into our requirement
that the decision maker must allocate some minimum amount of
utility to each group. Second, we focus on one-shot screening deci-
sions, in which decision makers simply choose whether or not to
acquire information on each individual, rather than sequentially
deciding how much information to acquire based on the results
of each past acquisition decision. Our one-shot formulation maps
to the binary decision structure (i.e., to screen or not to screen)
common in many institutions and leads to different optimization
challenges. Third, we directly model the tradeoff between screen-
ing and allocation decisions by tying both to a common budget
constraint (i.e., more screening means less funds are available to
ultimately distribute to individuals).
Elzayn et al. [13] also consider equitable ways to allocate re-
sources, but in a setting where learning occurs by repeatedly allocat-
ing resources instead of by purchasing information. In comparison
to our work, they focus on solving the problem of censored feed-
back, where the learner may not understand, and thus never allocate
resources to, groups who did not previously receive resources.
Finally, our work touches on research from the fair division
and allocation literature [5, 22, 27], which considers how to share
resources while satisfying fairness properties defined between indi-
viduals. The former devises mechanisms wherein strategic agents
self-divide the resources fairly, and the latter studies the existence
of allocations that jointly satisfy various fairness notions. In con-
trast to our work, that line of research is particularly concerned
with individual incentives, strategic action, and equilibrium effects.
3 A MODEL OF SCREENING AND
ALLOCATION
We model screening and allocation decisions as a sequential pro-
cess in which a budget-constrained lender first selects a (possibly
random) subset of candidates to further screen from a pool of n
applicants, and then, based on the information revealed in that
screening phase, selects a second (possibly random) subset of can-
didates to receive a loan.
We assume the value of lending to an applicant i is given by the
random variable Ui . These utilities are intended to capture the full
social value of providing loans, and we imagine the lender aims
to optimize social welfare, as in the case of a government agency.
In general, the lender has only partial information about Ui . More
specifically, if the lender chooses not to screen an applicant, we
assume the lender knows only the applicant’s conditional expec-
tation µi = E[Ui | Xi = xi ] given their pre-screening covariates
xi , such as credit score for those applicants who have traditional
credit histories. On the other hand, if the lender opts to screen an
applicant, they learn E[Ui | Xi = xi , X˜i = x˜i ], where x˜i denotes the
additional information one gains through screening. For example,
x˜i might encode applicant i’s history of paying their electricity or
phone bills—information that is often feasible to acquire with some
extra effort and which is a good indicator of creditworthiness [1].
When deciding whom to screen, we assume the lender knows the
distribution of D = (D1, . . . ,Dn ), where Di = E[Ui | Xi = xi , X˜i ].
That is, the lender knows how their estimate of utility could change
if they decide to screen each applicant, where these distributions
may depend on the available pre-screening covariates. A lendermay,
for example, thus choose only to screen applicants whose estimate
is likely to substantially change given additional information. We
further assume the lender must pay a fixed cost cS for screening
an applicant and a cost cA for underwriting a loan. For simplicity
we assume these costs do not vary across applicants, though it is
straightforward to extend to the more general case; see the online
appendix for details.
Based on knowledge of the above information and cost structure,
the lender selects a randomized strategy to screen applicants. That
is, the lender chooses a vector P = (p1, . . . ,pn ), meaning that each
applicant i is selected to be screened independently with probability
pi . Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn ) indicate which applicants are ultimately
screened under this policy; therefore, Si ∈ {0, 1} is a Bernoulli
random variable with probability of success pi .
Given this randomized screening policy, we can now write the
information Uˆ = (Uˆ1, . . . , Uˆn ) the lender has at the end of the
screening phase as follows:
Uˆi =
{
E[Ui | Xi = xi ] if Si = 0,
E[Ui | Xi = xi , X˜i ] if Si = 1.
(1)
In other words, Uˆi is the lender’s post-screening estimated utility of
giving a loan to applicant i . In particular, if Si = 1 (i.e., the applicant
is screened), the lender’s estimate changes from E[Ui | Xi = xi ],
the estimate based only on applicant i’s pre-screening covariates xi ,
to E[Ui | Xi = xi , X˜i = x˜i ], which incorporates the post-screening
information x˜i .
Finally, the lender chooses an allocation policy, denotedA(Uˆ) =
(A1, . . .An ), where Ai ∈ [0, 1] specifies the probability a loan is
(independently) offered to each applicant. Importantly, A is a func-
tion of the lender’s post-screening utility estimates Uˆ. For example,
the lender might give loans to the individuals with the highest
post-screening utility estimates, up to the budget constraint.
Combining all of the above, the lender’s optimization problem is
to choose screening and allocation policies (P∗,A∗) that maximize
expected welfare,
(P∗,A∗) ∈ argmax
P,A
E
[ n∑
i=1
UiAi
]
, (2)
subject to being budget-balanced in expectation,1
E
[ n∑
i=1
cSSi + cAAi
]
≤ B, (3)
where B is a fixed, non-negative constant.
In some settings, decision makers may value diversity in their
allocations. For example, they may wish to ensure a certain mini-
mum number of loans are provided to groups that historically have
been excluded from credit markets. One can encode this policy
preference directly into the utilities, in which case the resulting
optimization problem would incorporate one’s value for diversity.
That approach, however, requires decision makers to agree upon
these utilities to interpret the results, which can be challenging.
Here we take a complementary approach that explicitly allows
value for diversity to differ across decision makers. Suppose the ap-
plicant pool is partitioned intom groups {G1, . . . ,Gm }; for example,
ifm = 2, we might partition candidates into those who traditionally
have had access to credit markets and those who have not. Then
we require the selected policy (P∗,A∗) to allocate at least Λj ≥ 0
1By requiring the budget constraint to hold only in expectation—rather than exactly—
we are able to find a computationally tractable solution to the problem. In practice,
such a constraint means that agencies are allowed some flexibility as long as they
don’t overspend on average, which, we believe, is often a realistic requirement.
utility to group G j , where these utilities do not themselves include
any value for diversity:
E

∑
i ∈G j
UiAi
 ≥ Λj . (4)
In practice, as we discuss below, one would solve this optimization
problem for a range of Λ, which traces out the Pareto frontier of
possible policies across different group constraints, corresponding
to different values for diversity. The diversity condition above is
expressed in terms of utility, but we might, alternatively, simply
lower bound the number of loans
∑
i ∈G j Ai given to members of
each group G j . This alternative constraint can be handled in a
straightforward manner by our algorithm detailed below.
3.1 A stylized example
We illustrate the above ideas in the context of a simple, stylized
example. Suppose a lender must decide how best to allocate loans
among an applicant pool of 13 people, with an overall budget of
$2,000. Providing a loan costs cA = $400, and additional screening
of an applicant costs cS = $50.
Further suppose that five of the applicants are able to provide
rich credit histories, and the expected utility of giving each of them
a loan is µi = $750. For this group, additional screening would
not provide any more information. Imagine that the other eight
applicants do not have formal credit histories, and the utility of
giving them a loan is accordingly lower due to the risk of default,
with µi = $500. However, the lender knows that these applicants
come in two types that could be disambiguated through additional
screening. More specifically, the lender knows that after screening,
individuals in this group can be divided into those with expected
utility $1,000 (with 50% chance) and those with expected utility
$0 (with 50% chance). The high-utility group could, for example,
correspond to those who demonstrate a history of consistently
paying their bills on time.
The naive strategy that does not screen any individuals would al-
locate five loans to hit the budget constraint, since 5×$400 = $2,000.
All five loans would go to applicants with rich credit histories
(µi = $750) over those without (µi = $500). In this case, the total
expected utility of the no-screening allocation is 5 × $750 = $3,750.
But in this scenario, one can improve overall utility by screening
all eight applicants without formal credit histories and then grant-
ing loans to the high-utility applicants that are identified. Under
that strategy, we expect four of the eight screened applicants to
be identified as high utility ($1,000), and so the expected utility
of the allocation is 4 × $1,000 = $4,000, greater than the expected
utility of $3,750 under the no-screening strategy. Finally, the ex-
pected cost of the strategy is 8 × $50 = $400 for screening plus
4 × $400 = $1,600 for distributing the loans, totaling $2,000 and
satisfying the budget constraint. In this example, one can thus im-
prove overall utility—and even allocate more loans to the group
that a priori appears worse—by incorporating additional screening
into the decision-making process.
4 FINDING OPTIMAL POLICIES
We now derive an efficient algorithm to find optimal screening and
allocation policies (P∗,A∗), subject to the budget and diversity
constraints. We start by showing that over the full space of policies,
it is optimal to allocate resources according to a threshold policy,
with loans dispersed to individuals having post-screening expected
utility Uˆi above a group-specific threshold tj for j = 1, . . . ,m. Then,
for each threshold policy, we show the optimal screening policy can
be obtained by solving a linear program (LP), a type of optimization
problem with linear objective function and linear constraints, for
which their exist fast solution methods [3]. As a result, we can find
an optimal combined screening and allocation policy by sweeping
over threshold policies and solving the corresponding LP for each
such policy.
We begin by formally defining threshold policies.
Definition 1 (Threshold Policy). A threshold policy is an allocation
policy A for some fixed tj ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞} and α j ∈ [0, 1], j =
1, . . . ,m, such that
Ai =
{
1 Uˆi > tдi ,
αдi Uˆi = tдi ,
where дi denotes the group membership of individual i .
Threshold policies deterministically allocate resources to those
with post-screening expected utilities above a fixed, group-specific
threshold tj . Randomization (i.e., allocating resources with proba-
bility α j ) at the threshold tj may be necessary to exactly satisfy the
budget constraint, which is important because for an individual not
screened, the distribution of Uˆi is concentrated at a single point.
Theorem 2 below formally states that it is sufficient to restrict to
the set of threshold policies when searching for a globally optimal
screening and allocation policy.
Theorem 2. Suppose the constrained optimization problem defined
by Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) has a solution (P∗,A∗). Then there is a
threshold policy T ∗ such that (P∗,T ∗) is also a solution.
To see this, suppose that P∗ deterministically selects a subset of
applicants to screen. Then, for each groupG j , it is clear one should
allocate loans to the approximately kj individuals in each group
with the highest post-screening estimated utility, where kj is the
number of loans granted to each group underA∗. Such a rank-based
allocation can equivalently be written as a threshold rule with the
same expected utility. The more general case, in which screening
decisions are randomized, introduces some technical complications,
but the spirit of the argument is similar. Full details can be found
in the online appendix.
Now, given a threshold policy T with thresholds t1, . . . , tm ∈ R
and boundary randomization probabilities α1, . . . ,αm ∈ [0, 1], we
turn to finding an optimal companion screening policy. We show
that such an optimal screening policy P can be found by solving
an LP. In particular, the LP has n decision variables p1, . . . ,pn , with
pi ∈ [0, 1] specifying the probability that applicant i is screened;
the objective equals the utility of the combined screening and allo-
cation policy; and the constraints encode our budget and diversity
conditions.
To construct the LP, we first define the following quantities
that depend on both the threshold rule T and the lender’s prior
knowledge on the value of screening:
qi = Pr(Di > tдi ),
ei = E[Ui | Di > tдi ],
oi = 1µi>tдi + αдi · 1µi=tдi ,
where дi denotes applicant i’s group membership. Recall that µi de-
notes pre-screening expected utility and Di denotes post-screening
expected utility if applicant i is screened. Both µi and the distribu-
tion of Di are known in advance.
For fixed screening probabilities p = (p1, . . .pn ), the expected
utility of the corresponding screening and allocation policy can
now be expressed as a linear function of p:
n∑
i=1
[qi · ei · pi + oi · µi · (1 − pi )] . (5)
The first summand reflects the expected utility associated with
applicant i if they were screened, and the second summand reflects
the expected utility if they were not screened.
Our goal is to maximize the expression in Eq. (5) subject to the
budget and diversity conditions, which we now show can also
be expressed as linear constraints on p. In terms of the constants
defined above, the budget constraint can be written as
n∑
i=1
[cS · pi + cA · qi · pi + cA · oi · (1 − pi )] ≤ B. (6)
Likewise, the j diversity constraints in Eq. (4) become∑
i ∈G j
[qi · ei · pi + oi · µi · (1 − pi )] ≥ Λj , (7)
for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Together, the objective given by Eq. (5), with constraints defined
by Eqs. (6) and (7), define a linear program with decision variables
{pi }, the solution of which—if one exists— gives a screening policy
P∗ that is optimal for the threshold policy T . A jointly optimal
screening and allocation policy (P∗,T ∗) can accordingly be found
through a grid search over all threshold policies T in a (discretized)
space Rm × [0, 1]m . For each choice of policy T , defined by thresh-
old and randomization parameters t1, . . . , tm and α1, . . . ,αm , we
find the corresponding optimal screening policy P by solving the
LP described above. Then, among the resulting screening-allocation
pairs, the one maximizing utility is guaranteed to be globally opti-
mal.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We now investigate the value of our sequential screening and allo-
cation approach through two simulation exercises, one based on
synthetic data and another based on real loan data. First, with the
synthetic data, we examine the optimal policies as we vary both the
cost of screening and the value of the resulting information. Then,
with the real-world data, we illustrate how a decision maker could,
in practice, operationalize our screening and allocation approach
to pursue equity when distributing limited resources.
In each experiment, we allocate loans to members of two groups.
One of the groups—which we call the “targeted” group—can be
screened for more information at some cost, and we imagine there
is social value to distributing more resources to this group. For
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Figure 1: For an applicant with pre-screening likelihood
of being creditworthy xi = 0.4, the distribution of post-
screening creditworthiness, Pr[Yi = 1 | Xi = 0.4, X˜i ]. Under
a regime with high value of information (red line), the post-
screening distribution has higher variance than in a setting
with low value of information (blue line).
example, the targeted group may be comprised of those who tra-
ditionally have not had ready access to the banking system and
accordingly have limited formal credit history. For simplicity, we
further assume that those in the non-targeted group cannot be
screened, perhaps because they already have complete credit histo-
ries.
We define the utility of lending to applicant i to be
Ui =
{
a Yi = 1,
b Yi = 0,
(8)
where Yi ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether they would pay back the loan,
and a and b are fixed, known constants. In both of our experiments,
we set a = $1,000 and b = −$200, meaning there is $1,000 of
social utility when an applicant receives and pays back a loan and
−$200 utility when an applicant defaults on a loan, for example
because defaulting could trigger further financial distress. As above,
we imagine the lender is a government institution or other agent
attempting to maximize total social utility. We further assume that
the pre-screening covariate xi ∈ [0, 1] specifies the lender’s pre-
screening estimate of applicant i’s likelihood to repay a loan; in
other words, xi = Pr(Yi = 1 | Xi = xi ). The covariate xi can thus
be translated into (pre-screening) expected utility µi by Eq. (8):
E[Ui | Xi = xi ] = axi + b(1 − xi ).
5.1 Synthetic data
We illustrate the value of screening in four regimes of low vs. high
cost of information paired with low vs. high value of information.
To do so, we created four synthetic datasets, each comprised of
n = 500 individuals.
For all four datasets, we first evenly split the population into
targeted and non-targeted groups. For each applicant in the targeted
group, we generated their pre-screening probability of repayment
xi (or, equivalently, their observed pre-screening covariates) by
independently drawing from a beta distribution2 with mean 0.5
2We use the beta as it is a familiar, easily-parameterized function with support on
[0, 1].
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Figure 2: Comparison of our optimal screening strategy
(blue line) with one without screening (black line) in four
regimes with different costs and values of information.
and count parameter 50.3 Similarly, for each applicant in the non-
targeted group, we generated their pre-screening probability of
repayment by independently drawing from a beta distribution with
mean 0.70 and count parameter 50. The higher mean repayment
probability for members of the non-targeted group corresponds to
them being, on average, more creditworthy.
Now, for each applicant in the targeted group, the lender may
elect to screen them. As a result of screening, the lender receives
an improved estimate x˜i of the applicant’s repayment probability,
so that:
E[Ui | Xi = xi , X˜i = x˜i ] = ax˜i + b(1 − x˜i ).
We assume x˜i is drawn from a beta distribution with mean xi (i.e.,
the lender’s pre-screening estimate of the applicant’s repayment
probability). In the high-information scenario, we set the count pa-
rameter for this beta distribution to be 5; and in the low-information
scenario, we set it equal to 25.
Figure 1 shows these two post-screening information distribu-
tions for an applicant with xi = 0.4. As illustrated in the plot, the
high-information distribution (red line) has higher variance than
the low-information distribution (blue line), and so screening is
more likely to reveal very high risk and very low risk applicants in
the high-information setting. Finally, we set the cost of screening
cS to be $25 in the low-cost scenario and $100 in the high-cost
scenario, the cost of a loan to be cA = $1,000, and the total budget
to be B = $50,000.
Given these four datasets, we computed the optimal screening
and allocation strategies using the algorithm described above.4 In
our original problem formulation, the diversity constraint in Eq. (4)
specified only that we lower bound the utility of each group. To
3 In terms of the α and β shape parameters often used to parameterize beta distri-
butions, the mean is α/(α + β ) and the count parameter is α + β . A higher count
corresponds to a lower variance.
4Because only one group can be screened in our experiments, we use a faster variant
of our optimization algorithm, described in the online appendix. For any fixed set of
parameters, this approach returns the optimal screening and allocation policy within
a few seconds with the open-source LP solver SCS [24].
better understand the impact of diversity on utility, we modify this
constraint to be a strict equality for the utility of the targeted group
and set the lower bound on utility to be $0 for the non-targeted
group. Thus, across a range of exactly satisfied utilities for the
targeted group, we find the strategy that maximizes overall utility.
Figure 2 shows the results of this analysis, with the blue lines
tracing out the Pareto frontiers for each of the four scenarios we
consider. For comparison, the black lines show the correspond-
ing result under a strategy that does not screen any applicants.
Specifically, for any fixed utility constraint on the targeted group,
the optimal no-screening policy first allocates loans to the k indi-
viduals in the targeted group most likely to repay based on their
pre-screening estimates xi , where k is chosen to satisfy the utility
constraint; and then any remaining budget is used to allocate loans
to those in the non-targeted group most likely to repay.
When either the value of information is high (left column) or
the cost of screening is low (bottom row), we find that screening
can be a valuable tool to improve utility. Notably, screening plays
a more important role in these examples as we demand greater
utility be allocated to the targeted group, since the no-screening
strategy ends up dispersing loans to relatively high-risk applicants
in the targeted group even though more creditworthy applicants in
that group could be identified for little marginal cost. As one might
expect, the gap between the screening and no-screening strategies
is particularly large when both information is valuable and cheap.
Indeed, in the high-value, low-cost setting (lower-left panel), one
can achieve substantial diversity with little drop in overall utility.
5.2 Empirical credit data
We next apply our approach to the German Credit Dataset [17],
which includes a variety of individual-level socioeconomic and
financial characteristics (e.g., age, employment status, and credit
history) on a sample of n = 1,000 people, of whom 700 are deemed
creditworthy. We define the targeted group to be those who cur-
rently do not own their residence, a subpopulation that comprises
28% of the dataset. In this case, 60% of individuals in the targeted
group are creditworthy compared to 74% in the non-targeted group.
For members of the targeted group, we assume the lender, prior
to screening, only knows the targeted group’s overall base rate of
creditworthiness. If, however, the lender chooses to screen an appli-
cant in the targeted group, they learn x˜i , the applicant’s likelihood
of being creditworthy conditional on all the available features in
the dataset. For members of the non-targeted group, we assume
this full estimate of creditworthiness is available prior to screening,
and that there is no opportunity to obtain additional information.5
Finally, we translate estimates of creditworthiness to estimates of
utility via Eq. (8), in line with our simulations above.
Figure 3 shows the result of applying our screening and allocation
algorithm to this dataset, where we assume the cost of screening
cS is $100 (equal to our high cost regime in the synthetic datasets),
the cost of a loan cA is $1,000, and the total budget is B = $150,000.
Like before, we compare the Pareto frontier of our approach (blue
5More specifically, at the start of this exercise, we train a logistic regression model on
the full dataset predicting creditworthiness as a function of the available covariates.
Then, for members of the targeted group, x˜i is the model-estimated probability of
creditworthiness for applicant i ; and for the members of the non-targeted group, that
same model estimate is available prior to screening.
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Figure 3: For the German Credit Dataset, comparison of
our optimal screening strategy (blue line) with one without
screening (black line).
line) to that of a naive policy in which the lender does not screen
applicants (black line). As with the synthetic datasets above, we find
that the optimal policies with screening substantially outperform
those without screening, particularly when we enforce a diversity
constraint. For example, when we require $50,000 of utility to come
from allocating loans to the targeted group, the maximum total util-
ity under the no-screening policy is $102,000, compared to $119,000
under the screening policy, an increase of 17%.
6 DISCUSSION
Many creditworthy individuals often have difficulty gaining access
to traditional credit markets due to lack of formal financial histories,
an issue that can exacerbate existing socioeconomic disparities. To
address this gap, we developed a simple and efficient algorithm
for a budget-constrained decision maker to screen applicants and
then allocate a limited resource, an approach that we find offers
substantial benefits on both real and synthetic lending datasets.
This joint screening-plus-allocation approach is especially useful
in settings where a targeted subset of the population—those most
in need of an intervention—are also those for whom the least in-
formation is available a priori, a common situation in many social
welfare programs.
Past research has shown that a dearth of high-quality data for
various subgroups of the population can lead to poor models in a
variety of domains [15, 25], including text analysis [4, 7, 14], facial
recognition [6], and automated hiring [12]. Looking forward, our
combined data acquisition and decision-making approach provides
one framework to address this challenge by jointly modeling the
cost of data collection and the value for subsequent improvements
in downstream decisions.
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A PROOFS
We prove Theorem 2 in a more general setting in which we allow
the cost of screening cS and cost of allocation cA to vary for each
individual. In the special case of no screening (but with applicant-
specific costs of allocation), we note that our optimization problem
is equivalent to the fractional knapsack problem. For fractional
knapsack, the greedy strategy—in which one packs items in de-
scending order of their value per weight—yields an optimal solu-
tion [11]. In our case, we show that the same approach can be used
to find an optimal allocation of loans once the set of applicants to
screen has been appropriately selected.
To start, we generalize our definition of a threshold policy to
account for the applicant-specific allocation costs.
Definition 3 (Cost-Aware Threshold Policy). A cost-aware thresh-
old policy is an allocation policyA for some fixed tj ∈ R∪{−∞,∞}
and α j ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, . . . ,m, such that
Ai =
{
1 Uˆi/ci > tдi ,
αдi Uˆi/ci = tдi ,
where дi denotes the group membership of individual i and ci
denotes the cost of allocating resources to individual i .
We first analyze the setting of a single group, in which case our
threshold policy will have a single threshold, t . Lemma 4 shows
that in this case cost-aware threshold policies are non-dominated:
there cannot be an allocation policy with both higher expected
utility and lower cost than a single-threshold policy. Lemma 5 is an
existence theorem for cost-aware threshold policies, which shows
that if a particular expected cost or utility can be achieved by an
allocation policy, it can be achieved by a threshold policy.
Lemma 4. Let T be a cost-aware threshold policy with a single
threshold t > 0, and suppose T has an expected costC—i.e.,∑i E[ci ·
Ti ] = C—and expected utility ϒ—i.e.,∑i E[Ui ·Ti ] = ϒ. LetA be any
other allocation policy.
Case 1: If the expected cost of A is C , then the expected utility
of A is less than or equal to ϒ.
Case 2: If the expected utility of A is ϒ, then the expected cost
of A is greater than or equal to C .
Proof. Let ∆i = Ti −Ai , and set ∆−i be the negative part of ∆i ,
i.e., ∆i · 1∆i ≤0. Similarly, let ∆+i be the positive part.
The variables ∆+i represent circumstances in which A “saves
money” in expectation over T , and ∆−i represents how this portion
of the budget is reallocated.
Consider the following events:
E>i = {Uˆi > ci · t},
E=i = {Uˆi = ci · t},
E<i = {Uˆi < ci · t}.
Note that ∆+i , 0 only on some subset of E
>
i ∪ E=i . likewise, ∆−i ,
0 only on a subset of E<i ∪ E=i . Informally, A can only save in
expected cost over T when Uˆi ≥ t , and can only reallocate savings
to circumstances in which Uˆi ≤ t .
Because ∆+i ≥ 0 and ∆−i ≤ 0, it consequently follows that
∆+i · Uˆi ≥ ∆+i · ci · t , (9)
and
∆−i · Uˆi ≥ ∆−i · ci · t . (10)
In particular,
E
[ n∑
i=1
∆iUˆi
]
=
n∑
i=1
E[∆iUˆi ]
=
n∑
i=1
(
Pr(E>i ) · E[∆+i · Uˆi | E>i ]
+ Pr(E=i ) · E[∆i · Uˆi | E=i ]
+ Pr(E<i ) · E[∆−i · Uˆi | E<i ]
)
≥
n∑
i=1
(
Pr(E>i ) · E[∆+i · ci · t | E>i ]
+ Pr(E=i ) · E[∆i · ci · t | E=i ]
+ Pr(E<i ) · E[∆−i · ci · t | E<i ]
)
= t · E
[ n∑
i=1
ci∆i
]
.
Here the inequality follows from Eqs. (9) and (10).
Now, since any allocation policy is by definition conditionally
independent ofUi given Uˆi , it follows that E[AiUi ] = E[AiUˆi ] and
E[TiUi ] = E[TiUˆi ]. In consequence,
E
[ n∑
i=1
∆iUi
]
≥ t · E
[ n∑
i=1
ci∆i
]
. (11)
In Case 1, the expected costs of A and T are equal. It follows
that E [∑i ci∆i ] = 0; consequently, by Eq. (11), E [∑i ∆iUi ] ≥ 0,
and so the expected utility of T is greater than or equal to that of
A.
In Case 2, the expected utilities of A and T are equal, so that
E [∑i ∆iUi ] = 0. Then, again by Eq. (11), since t > 0, E [∑i ci∆i ] ≤
0. Therefore the expected cost of T is less than or equal to that of
A. □
Lemma 5. Let ϒ > 0 be an achievable expected utility—that is, there
is an allocation policy A such that E[∑i AiUi ] = ϒ—and let C be an
achievable expected cost. Then,
• There exists a cost-aware threshold policy T of expected utility
ϒ; and,
• There exists a (possibly different) cost-aware threshold policy
T of expected cost C .
Proof. We first address the case of a given positive expected
utility. Consider the function ϒ(t) : [0,∞) → R given by
ϒ(t) =
n∑
i=1
E
[
Ui · 1Uˆi /ci ≥t
]
. (12)
We note three facts about ϒ(t). First, ϒ(t) is monotonically non-
increasing for t ≥ 0. Second, ϒ(0) is the maximum expected utility
achievable by any allocation policy. Third, ϒ(t) → 0 as t →∞.
Suppose 0 < υ ≤ ϒ(0). Then there exists some maximal t such
that ϒ(t) ≥ υ. Let ρ = ∑i Pr(Uˆi/ci = t), τ = ∑i ci · ti , and δ =
ϒ(t) − υ. Define α = δ/(τ · ρ). Then the threshold policy defined by
(t ,α)will have expected utilityυ. The result follows as all achievable
positive expected utilities lie in the half-open interval (0, ϒ(0)].
The proof in the case of expected cost is similar. □
We are now equipped to move to analyze settings in which
there are multiple groups. We prove the following generalization
of Theorem 2.
Theorem 6. Suppose the constrained optimization problem defined
by Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) has a solution (P∗,A∗). Then there is a (not
necessarily single-threshold) cost-aware threshold policy T ∗ such that
(P∗,T ∗) is also a solution.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a solution screening and allo-
cation policy pair (P∗,A∗) satisfying the allocation diversity con-
straints.
Note that each of the collections A∗j = {A∗i }i ∈G j defines an
allocation policy on the subpopulation G j . Applying Lemma 5 to
each of them yields a threshold policy T ∗j —defined by the pair
(tj ,α j )—of the same expected cost asA∗j . By Lemma 4, T ∗j achieves
the same or higher expected utility on G j as A∗j .
Let T ∗ be the threshold policy defined by thresholds t1, . . . , tm
and boundary randomization probabilitiesα1, . . . ,αm . The expected
cost of T ∗ is the same asA∗. Moreover, T ∗ satisfies the group util-
ity constraints, since the utility it achieves on each group G j is
greater than or equal to A∗. Lastly, the expected utility achieved
by T ∗ is greater than or equal to that of A∗.
Since A∗ was assumed optimal, it must be that the expected
utilities are equal. Therefore the pair (P∗,T ∗) is also a solution to
the constrained optimization problem defined by Eqs. (2), (3), and
(4). □
Theorem 2 follows as an immediate corollary.
In some cases, it is useful to impose equality rather than in-
equality diversity allocation constraints. For instance, in some situ-
ations the decision maker may wish to obtain the Pareto frontier.
Lemma 7 ensures that it is still sufficient when specific utilities must
be achieved on subgroups to restrict to the set of threshold policies
when searching for a globally optimal screening and allocation
policy.
Lemma 7. The conclusion of Theorem 2 still holds even if the in-
equalities in Eq. (4) are replaced with equalities, i.e., if the optimal
policy pair (P∗,A∗) satisfies
E

∑
i ∈G j
UiAi
 = Λj . (13)
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 2, except that
Lemma 5 is used to construct a threshold policy T ∗ achieving
exactly utility Λj on any constrained group G j . Case 2 of Lemma 4
then shows that this utility is achieved at possibly less expected
cost than A∗. It follows immediately that the pair (P∗,T ∗) is a
solution to the optimization problem.6 □
6 In this case, it is actually possible that T∗ will result in expected cost savings over
A∗ , even though A∗ is optimal. This can occur if there is no remaining positive utility
to “spend” the savings on, since resources are already allocated at total expected cost
less than B in all cases where Uˆi is positive.
B OPTIMIZED PROCEDURE
In our experiments we consider cases in which screening provides
no additional information about one group of individuals (i.e., Di is
concentrated at a single point for i ∈ G j ). In this case, it is possible
to significantly reduce the number of LPs the decision maker must
solve to find an optimal policy or calculate the Pareto frontier. For
instance, a lender may already possess all available information
relevant to the creditworthiness of those with traditional credit
histories.
In this case, the cost of allocating resources to groupG j does not
depend on the screening policy P. Therefore, rather than sweeping
over all possible pairs of thresholds and boundary randomization
probabilities (tj ,α j ), one can encode the allocation policy to G j
directly as a collection of allocation probabilities {ai }i ∈G j .
For notational simplicity, suppose without loss of generality that
m = 2, that G1 = {1, . . . ,n1} and G2 = {n1 + 1, . . . ,n1 + n2}, and
that Di is a pointmass for all i ∈ G2.
Then, let p = (p1, . . . ,pn1 ) be a length n1 vector of probabilities
indicating the probability of screening the members of G1. Let a =
(an1+1, . . . ,an1+n2 ) be a length n2 vector of probabilities indicating
the probability of allocating resources to members of G2. We keep
the rest of the notation the same as in Section 4.
Fix threshold t1 and boundary randomization probability α1 for
G1. Then, the expected utility of any pair of screening policies (for
G1) and allocation policies (for G2) can be expressed as a linear
function of p and a:∑
i ∈G1
[qi · ei · pi + oi · µi · (1 − pi )] +
∑
i ∈G2
[µi · ai ] . (14)
Likewise, our budget constraint can be expressed as follows:
B ≥
∑
i ∈G1
[cS · pi + cA · qi · pi + cA · oi · (1 − pi )]
+
∑
i ∈G2
[cA · ai ]
(15)
The allocation diversity constraint will take one of the following
two forms. If the constrained group is G1,∑
i ∈G1
[qi · ei · pi + oi · µi · (1 − pi )] = Λ1. (16)
Otherwise, if the constrained group is G2, the constraint will be∑
i ∈G2
[µi · ai ] = Λ2. (17)
Lastly, we ensure that a and p are probability vectors:
ai ≤ 1, (18)
pi ≤ 1. (19)
Together Eqs. (14), (15), (16), and (17)—given the initial data of
the threshold policy T1 on G1 defined by the pair (t1,α1)—define a
linear program in then1+n2 decision variablesp = (p1, . . . ,pn ) and
a = (an1+1, . . . ,an1+n2 ) that can be solved for an optimal screening
policy P∗ (on G1) and allocation policy T ∗2 (on G2). By the results
of Appendix A, T ∗2 can be assumed to have the form of a threshold
policy. Sweeping over all such pairs in a (discretized) space R ×
[0, 1], the resulting triple (P∗,T ∗1 ,T ∗2 ) that maximizes utility will
represent a globally optimal screening and allocation policy.
